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The past decade has witnessed an increasing interest in the performance of mixed 
research and development (R&D) oligopolies
1. A contemporary and typical example of which is 
the research race to sequence the human genome between the private firm Celera and the public 
sector’s Human Genome Project (HGP). 
2  Of particular interest is whether the public sector can 
improve welfare by engaging in specific types of R&D (such as genome projects) when there are 
only a few private-sector firms conducting similar research.  In their seminal contribution to this 
literature, Delbono and Denicolo (1993) (D&D, henceforth) examine a mixed duopoly in which 
a public-sector and a private-sector firm compete, by investing in R&D, to innovate and patent.  
In comparison to a pure duopoly (two private-sector firms), where competition between firms in 
a winner-take-all patent race leads to aggregate overinvestment in R&D (see also Arrow (1962) 
and Barzel (1968) for earlier formulations of this idea), D&D show that the presence of a 
welfare-maximizing, public-sector firm in the duopoly can alleviate the problem of 
overinvestment.
3
                                                 
1 Mixed oligopolies are characterized by the presence of both profit maximizing private firms and welfare 
maximizing public sector firms in the market. See de Fraja and Delbono (1990) for a review of the mixed oligopoly 
literature. 
2  In this race Craig Ventner, CEO of Celera and formerly part of the public-sector human genome project, 
announced in 1991 that his firm would complete the sequencing in half the time of the HGP and at approximately 
10% of the cost.  Nonetheless the HGP continued, and jointly with Celera announced and published a genetic 
sequence for the human genome in 2000 (Marshall, 2000; Roberts, 2001) 
3 The social planner’s equilibrium defines the optimal solution; ‘overinvestment’, therefore, refers to R&D 
investment greater than the optimal solution. 
  2  However, the D&D result has not held up in further modeling.  In particular, Poyago-
Theotoky (1998) (P-T, henceforth) modifies the D&D model to consider the case in which 
public-sector R&D generates an innovation, which the private sector can costlessly imitate. In 
this case the private-sector firm has an incentive to free ride on the public-sector R&D, as the 
expected payoff in both the winning and losing states is equivalent.  Welfare in the mixed 
duopoly can be higher or lower than in the pure duopoly, depending on the size of the reward to 
innovation.
4
  P-T’s result that the private firm’s reaction curve is negative is a direct consequence from 
assuming that the benefits of the public sector’s innovation are fully appropriable by both firms. 
A state where the innovation can be perfectly imitated by a rival would arise if one assumes that 
firms are unable to protect their intellectual property or that they simply choose not to protect so 
as to encourage a wider dissemination of the innovation. The later case would seem to be 
consistent with the mission of the public-sector research firm, but as shown by P-T not 
necessarily socially optimal.  Allowing for costless imitation of the public firm results in too 
little research by the private firm and under-investment in the economy.  To counter the socially 
sub-optimal under-investment due to easy imitation, the public firm may limit access through IP 
protection. If we assume that there is perfect protection, such that no imitation occurs as in the 
D&D formulation, then the implication is that there is over-investment and the Nash equilibrium 
remains socially sub-optimal. The two extremes—of easy imitation and no imitation—would 
suggest that if the public-sector firm’s innovation is imperfectly appropriable and the public 
                                                 
4 As another example, in a somewhat different game Nett (1994) models private-sector firms as having more 
flexibility in their strategic behaviors than do public-sector firms.  This flexibility, in some cases, implies that the 
social surplus generated by the pure duopoly will exceed that of the mixed duopoly. 
  3sector firm could modulate the appropriability of its innovation, then the socially optimal level 
could be attained. We introduce an appropriability parameter and show this to be indeed the case.  
The notion of imperfect appropriability of an innovation can also be characterized as 
spillovers that occur in some product market after the conclusion of a research race. As such they 
are referred to as output spillovers to differentiate them from input spillovers, which occur 
during the course of a research. Input spillovers are most often defined as externalities that arise 
from the research efforts of individuals or firms.  Geroski (1995) identifies three modes through 
which input spillovers occur:  
“they routinely arise when different agents discuss subjects of mutual interest, or when 
research results are disseminated through publications and seminar presentations. 
Spillovers can also be created when one agent observes the actions of another and makes 
inferences about the thinking that lies behind those actions. Last but not least, spillovers 
occur when a researcher paid by one firm to generate new knowledge transfers to another 
firm (or creates a spin-off firm) without compensating his/her former employer for the 
full inventory of ideas that travels with him/her” (Geroski, 1995)  
 
These kinds of spillovers are especially true for public R&D, where evidence suggests that 
public research, especially research on biotechnology, plays an important role in the innovation 
process of US industry (McMillan, Narin and Deeds, 2000). 
Although the mechanism by which input and output spillovers affect R&D behavior is 
different, their impacts on overall research levels in a mixed oligopoly framework has not been 
studied.  We therefore extend the basic modeling framework of D&D and P-T models to study 
the effect of input and output spillovers, and their impact on social welfare. The explicit 
modeling of input spillovers also allows us to consider the impact of joint ventures between 
private and public sectors firms where there is complete sharing of research among participants 
and hence complete spillovers.  
  4The next section of the paper develops the model incorporating our ideas of R&D 
spillovers in a mixed oligopoly R&D race. The next two sections solve the model for the 
noncooperative and cooperative case with a view of discussing the properties of the two firm’s 
reaction curves and the resulting equilibrium. Section five presents the social welfare criterion. 
Section six presents the simulation result, comparing the cooperative and noncooperative cases. 
The final section draws conclusions. 
2 Model 
  Consider a one-shot non-cooperative game between a profit-maximizing private-sector 
firm (P) and welfare maximizing public-sector firm (S), where the firms invest in R&D with the 
aim of innovating. The firm that innovates first is awarded an exogenously determined prize (W), 
which is the same for the two firms, i.e., SP WWW = =
5,6.  The prize is imperfectly appropriable 
such that the winning firm receives (1 )W α −  and the losing firm  W α  for 00 . 5 α ≤≤ . The 
interpretation of the appropriability parameter within the present context is the following. Most 
R&D race models have assumed that the returns to R&D for the winning firm is value of the 
prize (W), with the losing firm getting nothing (the winner-take-all assumption). However, if we 
assume that the neither firm is able to appropriate all of the returns to its research, than it is 
natural to assume that the rival firm will accrue some benefits even if it were to lose the race. By 
assuming that some benefits of the innovation are appropriated by the rival firm, so that 
00 . 5 α <≤ , then the potential returns to the firm in the losing state are  W α . The more 
                                                 
5 D&D justify the equivalence of prize assumption on the grounds that “when the private firm is a perfectly 
discriminating monopolist, whereas the public-sector firm maximizes social welfare also in the product market.” 
6 Throughout the paper we use the subscript P to denote the private-sector firm and the subscript S to denote the 
public-sector firm 
  5restrictive access to an innovation becomes, say due to increased patenting by the winning firm, 
the lower the opportunity for the rival firm to copy the winning firm’s innovation and reap 
benefits.  D&D implicitly assumed that the each firm can appropriate all the returns to its 
research, thus  0 α =  in their formulation. P-T considers the other extreme wherein the private-
sector firm costlessly acquires any innovation generated from the public-sector research, so that 
in both states, the private firm receives  . / Wr
7
As in D&D and P-T we characterize the public sector firm as maximizing welfare by 
accounting for the total R&D spent by both public and private firms, whereas the private sector 
only accounts for its (private) R&D cost in its profit maximizing calculus. Building on the 
existing literature on innovation races (Reinganum, 1989; Lee and Wilde, 1980), we model R&D 
as a Poisson process. That is the probability of a firm innovating in the time interval ( , tt d t + ), 
and that no other firm has innovated by time t, is a function of the R&D intensity at t 
undertaken by that firm. Further the relationship between the probability of innovating and R&D 
is assumed to be independent and exponential.  
Following Martin (2000), we model input spillovers as increasing a firm’s effective 
research intensity,   defined as   i g
  iij gx s x j = +  (1) 
for   and  ,, ij PS = j i ≠  and with  . Here  0 j s ≤≤ 1 i x  is a firm’s own research intensity and  j x  is 
the research intensity of its rival. The spillover parameter determines how much of a rival firm’s 
R&D becomes a part of own firm’s effective research—with  0 i s =  implying no spillovers and 
                                                 
7 In contrast to the P-T specification, we assume that the winning firm is guaranteed to receive at least half or more 
of its winnings. Hence, if the innovation is perfectly appropriable then  0 α =  and the winner keeps all of its 
proceeds. If the innovation is imperfectly appropriable (00 . 5 α < ≤ ), the losing firm also benefits, as it is able to 
appropriate some of the winning firm’s prize. In the extreme when the prize is not appropriable ( 0.5 α = ), both 
winning and losing receive an equal share of the prize. 
  61 i s =  implying complete spillovers. Given the asymmetric objectives of the two firms, we 
assume that spillovers from the public firm will be greater than from the private firm:  P S ss ≤ . 
This is consistent with the observation that public sector firms are more open to disseminating 
their research results then private firms. To attain research intensity  i x , the instantaneous 
resource cost for both firms is increasing and given by the function  ( ) i x γ  having the following 
properties 
1)  (0) 0 '(0) γ γ ==  
2)  0, '( ) , ''( ) x xx xx γ γ ∀≥ ≥ >  
The payoff function of the private firm is specified as the present value of expected 
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P  (2b) 
where r is the discount rate.  
The exponential term consists of the discount factor  rt e−  times the probability that no 
firm has innovated to time t, 
( ps ) g gt
e
−+
.  The numerator in equation (2b) is the expected value 
at time   of the net benefits from staying in the race from time t to time  t td t + , conditional on the 
fact that no firm has yet innovated.  These expected net benefits include the expected present 
value of winning, ((1 ) / Wr ) p g α − , plus the expected present value of losing, ( / ) S Wr g α , less 
the certain cost of staying in the race,  P x . Written this way, the private firm wins the race with 
probability  , and receives a flow of profits  P gd t (1 )W α − . On the other hand, if the public-sector 
  7firm wins the race the flow of profits to the private-sector firm is reduced and becomes a 
function of the appropriability parameterα . 
  Next, we specify the payoff to the public-sector firm. The innovation entails a social 
benefit, which, as stated earlier, is assumed to be equivalent to the prize obtained by the private 
firm. Since only one innovation is in prospect, the public-sector firm is indifferent as to who 
wins the race; to the public-sector firm the expected date of innovation is what matters. 
Moreover, the public-sector firm takes into account the R&D costs of both firms. It is in these 
respects that the public-sector firm is considered a welfare-maximizing firm
8. The public-sector 
firm’s payoff is specified as 
() ()
0 P's probability S's probability
exp{ ( ) } (1 ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) SP S P S S P P
W
Vg g r t g g g g x x
r
αα αα γ γ
∞ ⎡⎤ ⎛⎞
⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ =− + + − + + − + −−
⎢⎥ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
∫  	  
 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S  (3b) 
It is important to note that the appropriability parameter (α ) does not appear into the public-
sector firm’s payoff. As a social-welfare maximizer, the public-sector firm is concerned only 
with generating benefits W, not with who obtains these benefits. Further, the fact that the private-
sector firm can easily imitate public research firm when  0.5 α = , does not diminish the aggregate 
value of the prize. This is an important point and requires emphasizing. We have already 
assumed that the value of the innovation is the same across the two innovators and not related to 
who innovates. That is, the ‘prize’ to the public-sector firm is social welfare whereas to the 
private-sector firm it is private profits when it is a perfectly discriminating monopolist, the value 
of the prize is equal across the two firms. The notion of appropriability would suggest that if the 
                                                 
8 The underlying assumption here is that a faster pace of innovation in the economy is welfare increasing.  
  8benefits of a firm’s innovation are appropriated among several users (due to large spillovers) 
then its profits should be lower relative to the case where it is able to appropriate all the benefits 
to itself. However, for the public-sector firm profits, and more crucially the distribution of profits 
among firms, are irrelevant, since the public-sector firm maximizes social welfare. Since the 
concept of social welfare constitutes individual firm profits, the public-sector firm is less 
concerned with whether it makes lower profits (and hence someone else more) due to decreased 
appropriability as total social welfare remains unchanged given our assumptions on equivalence 
of the prize. Appropriability would, however, matter to all firms if all were profit-maximizing 
firms. In this case, an increasing ability to appropriate returns by firm i (should it win) would 
imply decreasing post-innovation profits for firm j (the losing firm)
9. 
3  The Noncooperative Case 
Model Equilibrium 
 
To characterize the Nash equilibrium in R&D space (xP, xS), we derive, for each firm, the 
best response function and its properties. We first examine the noncooperative case where the 
two firms compete in the research and product markets followed by analysis of the joint venture 
case, where firms compete in the research market but remain competitive in the output market. 
From the first order condition for a maximum, the reaction curve of the private-sector firm is  
                                                 
9 That is if W is the value of the prize then, under conditions of imperfect appropriability, the winning firm in a pure 
duopoly will receive (1 )W α −  and the losing firm  W α  with 00 . 5 α ≤ ≤  (the lower bound representing highest 
appropriability and the upper bound the lowest appropriability). Thus, the case where the winning firm is unable to 
appropriate any of the rents from winning, such that  0.5 α = , we get the result where prize in both winning and 
losing states are equal.  In the mixed duopoly case, matters are different and the prize for the public sector firm in 
the two state will always be W . 
  9 
()
[,] () ' () ( )
(1 )(1 2 ) (1 ) ( ) '( )( ) 0
PPS P P P S
S
PS P P P P PP SS
Rxx x x rx x W
Wx




≡− + + +
+− − − − +− + =
 (4) 
  To facilitate interpretation, the reaction curve has been specified such that the effect of 
the spillover and appropriability parameters is separated. The term on the first line of the right 
hand side of equation (4) is the private firm’s best response function without the spillover effect 
and under perfect appropriability. The terms on the second line represent the change to the best 
response function when the public sector firm’s innovation is not perfectly appropriable and 
there are input spillovers present. Similarly the reaction curve of the public firm is implicitly 
defined by 
 
[,] () () ' () ( )
(( ) ( ) ) ' ( ) ( ) 0
SSP P S S P S
SP S S P P S S
R xx x x x x x r W
sW x x x s x s x
γ γγ
γγ γ
≡+− + + +
++ − +=
 (5)   
As with the reaction function of the private firm we specify the effect of the parameters 
separately. To help us identify the Nash equilibrium in the  , P S x x  space, we state the following 
lemmas to establish the shape of the reaction curves.   
Lemma 1:  Define  [,]0 PSP Rxx=  as the private-sector firm’s reaction function (equation 
(4)), and   as the public firm’s reaction function (equation  [,]0 SSP Rxx = (5)). Then 
a)  The reaction functions are continuous 




S x x = --the stand alone incentives coincide 
c)  , 0, 0,0.5 ,  and  , 0,1 SP P S xx s s α ∀> ∈ ∈  
1.   (private-sector firm’s reaction curve positively sloped) 
iff 
[] / 0 PS S dx x dx >
(1 )(1 2 ) '( ) (1 ) P SP S Ws s x rs α γ −− > + 0 PS ss . For  = α ==, [ ]/ P SS dx x dx  
is unambiguously positive. 
  102.   (private-sector firm’s reaction curve negatively sloped) 
iff 
[] / 0 PS S dx x dx <
(1 )(1 2 ) '( ) (1 ) P SP S Ws s x rs α γ −− < + 1 PS ss . For  = =  and  0.5 α = , 
[] / P S dx x dxS  is unambiguously negative  
D.  , , 0  and  , 0,1 PS P S xx s s α ∀> ∈  
1.   (public-sector firm’s reaction curve positively sloped) iff  [] / 0 SP P dx x dx >
(1 ) '[ ] (1 ) '[ ] SP P sx sx S γ γ +> +. For  P S ss = ,   is 
unambiguously positive for 
[ ]/ 0 SP P dx x dx >
P S x x > . 
2.   (public-sector firm’s reaction curve negatively sloped) iff  [] / 0 SP P dx x dx <
(1 ) '[ ] (1 ) '[ ] SP P sx sx S γ γ +< +. For  P S ss = ,   is 
unambiguously negative for 
[ ]/ 0 SP P dx x dx <
P S x x < . 
E. There exists a Nash equilibrium for this game. 
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix. 
The interpretation of Lemma 1 is as follows. Consider first the case of where all three 
parameter values are zero. The marginal cost of undertaking R&D is  '[ ] i x γ  and the prize value, 
or benefit, for the winning firm is W/r. Since the prize value is exogenous and does not change 
with research effort, the marginal benefit from R&D is equal to the total benefit, W/r.  The 
private firm will increase its research effort in response to research by the public firm so long as 
the marginal benefit is greater than marginal cost. When there are no input spillovers and both 
firms can completely appropriate their research prize (losing firm gets nothing), then the private 
firm’s reaction curve is always increasing as marginal benefit is always greate then marginal cost 
(/ ' [] P Wr x γ > ). In the presence of imperfect appropriability, the marginal benefit decreases by 










the extreme case of complete spillovers and imperfect appropriability  1 PS ss = =  and  0.5 α = , 
we get the case that marginal benefit 








⎟  reduces to zero and hence is always 
less than marginal cost, in which case the private firm’s reaction curve is decreasing and the 
private firm will free ride off the research effort of the public firm. 
The shape of the public firm can also be interpreted in a similar fashion. We have stated 
that from the perspective of the public firm, the timing of innovation is what matters not who 
wins the race or the value of the prize. As such, the appropriability parameter do not enter into 
the public firm’s reaction function. The response of the public sector firm to research by the 
private firm depends on the relative marginal cost of undertaking research by the two firms. 
Since the public sector firm is concerned only that the innovation occur quickly, and assuming 
no spillovers, the public sector firm decreases its research effort if the private firm has a lower 
marginal cost (and thereby increasing the private firm’s chances of winning) and increases its 
research if it (the public sector firm) has a lower marginal cost of doing research.  Spillovers 
from the rival firm increase a firm’s effective research intensity but the incoming spillovers does 
not lower the marginal cost of doing research. Rather the incoming spillovers, from the 
perspective of the public firm, effectively lowers the marginal cost of the R&D from where the 
spillovers originate as they not only increase the likelihood of the firm innovating, but also 
increases the likelihood of its rival innovating. In other words, spillovers increase the 
productivity of R&D in the economy. Increasing spillovers from the public-sector firm to the 



















⎟ , the public firm 
responds by increasing its research effort.   
 
Comparative Statics 
The effect on research effort due to changes in appropriability and spillovers can be 
established by taking the partial derivatives of the reaction functions. For the private firm, 
research effort is decreasing in appropriability and input spillovers from the public sector, but is 
ambiguous for the for own input spillovers:  
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∂ ) )  (8) 
The private firms decrease its research effort under decreasing appropriability as the 
public-sector firm finds it easy to imitate the private firm’s innovation and thereby reducing the 
benefit of the innovation for the private firm. When there are input spillovers from the public 
sector firm, the free-rider effect works in favor of the private firm and consequently the private 
firm reduces its research effort (equation (7)). And although one would expect that the spillovers 
from the private firm to the public-sector firm would reduce the incentives for the private firm to 
undertake research, we need to account for the effect on incentives due to appropriability. Note 
that in equation (8) the second term  ( ) () ' () PP P rx xx γγ −  is always negative as marginal cost of 
undertaking research is greater than the average cost of research. This implies that the signage of 
  13(8) depends on the first term, and critically on the value of α . When  0 α =  and the winner take 
all assumption is maintained, the private firm will look unfavorably on any research leakage as it 
stands not to benefit from its rival winning the race. However if the private firm stands to gain 
some benefit in the losing state—assume the extreme case of  0.5 α = —then it want its research 
effort to benefit the public-sector firm as well since the prize value when  0.5 α =  is equivalent in 
the losing and winning states.
10
The public-sector firm is unaffected by appropriability and hence its research effort does 
not change with changes in appropriability-- / 0 S x α ∂ ∂=. Like the private sector, the public-
sector firm’s research effort is declining in spillovers from the private firm but ambiguous as to 
the effect of own spillovers. That is,   























S  (10) 
  Figure 1 is a graphical representation of how changes in the appropriability parameter 
affects the public and private reaction curves for fixed values of the spillover parameter. 
When 0 PS xxα == = , the D&D result is obtained and the Nash equilibrium is represented 
by
DD N . As appropriability of the prize value decreases ( 0.5 α → ), the reaction curve of the 
private firm shifts leftward and the slope becomes negative for high values of α . Since 
appropriability has no effect on the public-firm’s reaction curve, it remains unchanged. Figure 2 
show how changes an increase in the spillover from the rival firm affects the reaction curves. 
Increasing spillovers from the public-sector firm shifts the private firms’ reaction curve leftward. 
                                                 
10 When  0.5 α =  equation (8) reduces to  ( ) // ( 0 . 5 ) ( ) ' ( PP P P P ) x sW r x x x γγ ∂∂ = + −  which is positive so 
long as    () /( 0 . 5 ) ( ) ' ( ) PP P Wr x x x γγ >−
  14Increasing spillovers from the private firm shifts the public sector firm’s reaction curve 
downward. 
4.   The Cooperative (Joint Venture) Case 
   In a joint venture, the two firms conduct independent research but equally share the 
results of their research and cost.
11 This means that there are complete R&D spillovers between 
the two firms ( ) and the cost of undertaking research for the each firms is 
.  With complete R&D spillovers, the effective research intensity for both 
firms becomes   for 
1 PS ss ==
( () () / 2 PS xx γγ + )
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Note that equations (11) and (12) are equivalent which has some interesting implications. Firstly, 
appropriability in joint ventures no longer matters, as by combining their research effort, the two 
                                                 
11 This characterization of research is different from that of Martin (2001) who differentiates between and 
“operating entity [research joint venture] RJV” and a “secretariat RJV”. Under an operating entity RJV the two 
firms establish a common R&D laboratory and share the cost, whereas under s secretariat RJV each firm conducts 
its own research but share the results, though not the costs.  
 
  15firms have become one entity and the stakes in winning are the same for both of them. Second, 
by undertaking joint venture activities the private firm is forced to internalize the cost of research 
of the public sector firm. Since the public sector firm is welfare maximizing, it was already 
internalizing the cost (and benefits) of both firms. As with the noncooperative case, we 
characterize the Nash equilibrium of the game by first specifying the reaction curves for the two 
firms. From the first order condition for a maximum, the reaction curve of the private firm and 
the public sector firms is given by: 
  () ( ) [, ] 2 () () ' () 2 ( ) 0 iij i j i i j Rxx W x x x r x x γγ γ ≡++ − + + =  for  , iP S = , i  (13)  j ≠
   Given the symmetric nature of the reaction curves, the following lemma establishes the 
curvature properties of the reaction curves and the existence of the Nash equilibrium in a joint 
venture:  
Lemma 2: Define  [, ]0 iij Rxx=  for  , iP S =  and ij ≠  as the ith firm’s reaction function 





S x x = --the stand alone incentives coincide 
B.  The best-response function for each firm is downward sloping if  ij x x >  and upward 
sloping if  ij x x <  
c)  There exists a Nash equilibrium such that 
N N
PS x x =  
From lemma 2 observe that the behavior of the public firm remains unchanged relative to 
the noncooperative case (for  P S ss = ), but the private firm’s reaction curve is now a direct mirror 
image of the public firm. Due to the symmetric nature of the reaction curves, the Nash 
equilibrium occurs where the two firms invest the same amount in R&D activities. 
Figure 3 shows the reaction curves of the two firms in a joint venture.  
  16 
5.   Social Welfare 
Following D&D and P-T, we define the social optimum as one that is an outcome of a 
Nash game between two welfare maximizing public-sector firms under the control of a social 
planner. Mathematically this means that the social welfare is given by equation (2), evaluated at 
PS x x == x
s
1
, where x is the common R&D investment rate. Since both firms are under the social 
planners’ control, we assume that R&D spillovers between the two firms are equal ( ), 
but not necessarily complete ( ). By maintaining the parameterization of the spillover 
allows us to compare the noncooperative case with that of the social welfare for a given spillover 
level. Substituting x into equation (2b) we get 
PS ss ==
0 s ≤≤
  ( ) (/ ) 2 ( 1) 2 ( )
2( 1 )







From the first-order condition for a maximum, the social optimum is then given by the following 
condition:  
  (1 ) '( )(2 (1 ) ) 2 ( )(1 ) 0 Ws x xs r xs γ γ +− +++ +=  (15) 
Geometrically, the social optimum is the point where the social welfare reaction curve intersects 
the 45-degree line. This implies that in the mixed duopoly the social optimum is achieved if in 
the Nash equilibrium **
PS
* x xx == . 
  Having established the social optimum point, we are now in a position to evaluate how 
the non-cooperative and cooperative Nash equilibrium compare to the social optimum. D&D 
show that for the case of no spillovers and perfect appropriability, the equilibrium point in the 
(noncooperative) mixed duopoly is closer to the social optimum then it is for the private duopoly.  
In the P-T case, where the appropriability of the prize is imperfect due to easy imitation, the 
  17social welfare performance of the mixed and private duopolies relative to each other is a function 
of the value of the prize. That is for small prize value, the welfare in the mixed duopoly exceeds 
welfare in the private duopoly; for large prizes the welfare in the private setting is greater. 
  In the presence of spillovers and imperfect appropriability the social optimum can be 
achieved by  
Proposition 1: Within the mixed duopoly setting and assuming a noncooperative game, 
then, there exists α   (0 0.5 α <<  ),  P s   (0 1 P s < <  ) and   (0 S s  1 S s < <  ) for which the 
social welfare is maximized. 
  What the above proposition says is that when input spillovers and appropriability (output 
spillovers) are exogenously determined and for any prize value, the amount of spillovers that the 
each firm allows in the strategic game can be regulated to achieve the social optimum. For 
example, consider a social planner that has prior knowledge of the payoffs for the private-sector 
firm and public-sector firms. Given any W and r, and the curvature properties of the best 
response functions, it is relatively straightforward to calculate for α  that result in the Nash being 
the social optimum. 
  In a joint venture we have established that appropriability does not matter and input 
spillovers are predetermined to be at 1. Proposition 2 establishes that in such a state the 
equilibrium research of a joint venture is the social optimum.  
Proposition 2: The Nash equilibrium attained in a joint venture is the social optimum 
when    1 s =
6.  Comparison of Nash Equilibrium: A Simulation 
  To further fix some of the ideas presented, we carry out a simulation exercise and 
examine how changes in the parameter values affect equilibrium R&D, firm payoffs and social 
  18welfare. Our approach is to assign values to W and r, as well as functional form to the cost 
function to simultaneously solve for the  P x  and  S x  using the derived reaction curves
12. These 
Nash values for x are then used to calculate the equilibrium payoffs.  
  The simulation results are presented in Tables 1 to 3.  For the joint venture case even 
though the social optimum is reached (97.7889), the private payoff is relatively small (48.8944). 
This suggests that the incentive for private firm to participate in a joint venture will be low under 
certain circumstances. That is private firms find it profitable to form a joint venture only if there 
are very high spillovers and low appropriability of the research prize in the noncooperative case 
(in which case the private firm has higher payoff by cooperating).  
 
7. Conclusion 
  In this paper the theoretical contributions of the D&D and P-T were strengthened to 
include the nuances of public and private sector research interactions. Specifically our modeling 
takes into account the observation that research spillovers, ex-post, are seldom “all or nothing”, 
but can be modulated such that recipient of the spillovers (i.e. the private firm in a mixed 
duopoly) benefits only partly from the prize of the winning firm. We also incorporate the notion 
of input spillovers that occurs during the course of a research race. Our modeling points to 
instances where the private firm reduces its research effort in response to public sector research. 
However, given the social welfare maximizing objectives of the public sector firm, the loss of 
appropriability and spillovers from the public sector does not have same affect on the public 
firm. Furthermore, modeling and simulation results suggest that joint ventures between private 
and public sector firms may only occur in the presence of high spillovers and low appropiability. 
                                                 
12 For all of our simulation we used the following values:  10 W = ,  0.1 r =  and 
2 () x x γ =  
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  21 Proof of Lemma 1: 
A) Following D&D, we note that both reaction functions (equations 4 and 5) are quasi-
concave and, therefore, from the maximum theorem the functions are continous. 
B)  Setting  into (4) and  0 S x = 0 S x =  into (5) we get,  
  ( ) '( ) ( ) '( ) 0 ii i i Wr x x x x γγγ −+ − =  (16)   
C)   Implicitly differentiating equation (4), and assuming that the second order condition is 
satisfied, we get  









=− − −+ ⎢⎥
⎣⎦
]  (17) 
Equation (17) breaks down the curvature of the private-sector firm reaction into two 
terms, { } (1 )(1 2 ) PS Ws s α −−  and { } '( ) (1 ) PS x rs γ −+ , with the signage depending on 
which value is greater. In the extreme case of   0 PS ssα = ==, '( ) P Wx r γ >  as…. 
When   and  1 PS ss == 0.5 α = , 0 '( ) P x r γ < . 
D) Implicitly differentiating equation (5), and assuming that the second order condition is 
satisfied, we get  









=+ − + ⎢⎥
⎣⎦
]  (18) 
As in (C)  above, Equation (17) breaks down the curvature of the public-sector firm 
reaction into two terms, { } (1 ) '[ ] SP sx γ +  and { } (1 ) '[ ] PS sx γ −+ , with the signage 
depending on which value is greater. For the case of  P S ss = , the curvature properties of 
the public firm are unambiguous and follow from the properties of the cost function. 
  22E)  Existence of a Nash equilibrium follows from the continuity and quasi-concavity 
properties of the reaction functions. (Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green, pg .) 
Proof of Lemma 2: 
A)  Setting   for   into (13)   0 j x = , iP S =
  () ( ) 2( ) ' ( ) 2 ( ) ii i Wx x rx γγ +− += 0  for  , iP S =  (19) 
B)  Implicitly differentiating equation (13) we obtain: 









⎡ ⎤ =− ⎢⎥ ⎣ ⎦
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
 for  , iP S =  (20) 
which is positive for  j i x x >  and negative for  ij x x >  
C)  Existence of a Nash equilibrium follows from the continuity and quasi-concavity 
properties of the reaction functions. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
Forthcoming 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
From Lemma 2 part C, we know that in the Nash equilibrium, both firms conduct the 
same amount of research. At the Nash the reaction curve of the each firm reduces to 
  () ( ) 22 ( ) ' ( ) 4 Wx x r x γγ 0 + −+ =  (21) 
This is equal to the social welfare condition for  1 s = . 
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Figure 3: Public and Private Sector Firm’s Reaction Curves in a joint venture 
 
 
Figure 2: Forthcoming 
 




P x  
Private firm’s Rxn Curve 
Public-sector 
firm’s Rxn 
Curve Table1: Simulation for the noncooperative case 
0 α =      0.25 α =   0.5 α =  
P s   S s  
*
S x  
*
P x  
*
P V  
*
S V  
*
S x  
*
P x  
*
P V  
*
S V  
*
S x  
*
P x  
*
P V  
*
S V  
0  1  11.3439 18.0040 63.9993 88.6539 6.1638 9.2550  56.4900 93.8362 2.9461  0.4036 49.1928 97.0539
0  .75  11.4272 19.3566 61.2868 86.9403 6.1757 9.9554  55.0893 92.9421 2.8901  0.4638 49.0723 96.6970
0  .5  11.2834 20.7664 58.4673 84.9554 6.0738 10.6897 53.6202 91.9016 2.8074  0.5454 48.9092 96.2568
0  .25  10.7584 22.0805 55.8390 82.7865 5.7813 11.3882 52.2236 90.7499 2.6784  0.6616 48.6768 95.7145
0  0  9.62761 22.9433 54.1134 80.7448 5.1864 11.824  51.2352 89.6271 2.4654  0.8377 48.3245 95.0693
.25  1  7.16234 12.3539 60.2338 92.8377 4.2430 6.5837  54.4661 95.7570 2.8556  0.5010 49.1843 97.144 
.25  .75  7.5016 14.0671  57.4927 91.4267 4.3454 7.4642 53.0574  95.0339 2.77493 0.5871 49.0607 96.8286
.25  .5  7.6202 15.8058  54.7107 89.8125 4.3422 8.3647 51.6165  94.2105 2.6572 0.6917 48.8934 96.4570
.25  .25  7.37824 17.3811 52.1902 88.1948 4.1634 9.1966  50.2855 93.3386 2.4792  0.8393 48.6572 96.0333
.5  1  4.3719  7.7847 56.2871 95.6281 3.0376 4.4511 52.3986  96.9624 2.7490 0.6186 49.1752 97.2510
.5  .75  4.8834  9.8362 53.5517 94.4189 3.1710 5.5118 50.9843  96.3730 2.6414 0.7133 49.0490 96.9812
.5  .5  5.20015 11.8917 50.8111 93.0665 3.2232 6.5710  49.5720 95.7024 2.4882  0.8403 48.8796 96.6821
.75  1  2.7253  4.2247 52.3147 97.2743 2.3958 2.7078 50.4768  97.6042 2.6292 0.7296 49.1662 97.3708
.75  .75  3.2272  6.5737 49.6300 96.3118 2.4583 3.9971 49.0033  97.1905 2.4951 0.8410 49.0389 97.1484
1  1  2.5001  0.8415 47.5528 96.5528 2.5001 0.8415 49.0915  97.4900 2.5001 0.8415 49.1585 97.4999
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Table 2: Simulation for the joint venture case 
   α ∀  
P s   S s   S x   P x   P V   S V  
1 1  2.2112  2.2112  48.8944  97.7889 
 
Table 3: Simulation for the social optimum under different spillover parameter values 
x s    V 
1 2.2112  97.7889 
.75 2.2077  97.4769 
.5 2.2010  97.0627 
.25 2.1964  96.4857 
0 2.1866  95.6267 
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